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The institution of slavery displays a puzzling historical pattern: it is found
mostly at intermediate stages of agricultural development, in horticultural soci-
eties, and less frequently among hunter-gatherers and societies at more advanced
agrarian stages. We explain this rise-and-fall pattern of slavery in a growth model
with land and labor as inputs in production. The ￿organization￿ of society is
determined endogenously, and depends on agricultural technology and popula-
tion density, both of which also evolve endogenously over time, and depend on
how society is organized. The model replicates the full transition of the economy
from an egalitarian society with no property rights; to a slave society where a
despotic ruler owns both land and people; and ￿nally into a society with a free
labor market, where the ruler owns all land but all agents own their labor. In
this process, the role of population growth switches from being a force driving
the transition into a slavery, to a force behind the transition from slavery to free
labor. Our model also explains several other historical facts, e.g. why Europeans
replaced free labor with slavery following the discovery of the Americas, and why
those states in the 19th century US which had sparser population had a larger
percentage slaves in the population.
21. Introduction
Since the birth of mankind we have come up with increasingly productive ways to
use land for subsistence production. We have gone from hunting and gathering;
via diﬀerent stages of horticulture, i.e. farming without plows, like ￿slash-and-
burn￿ cultivation; to agriculture, i.e. plow-based farming using harnessed animals
(Nolan and Lenski 1999).
As food production has evolved, so have other features of human societies.
Population has become denser and more strati￿ed, gender roles in food production
have changed, institutions like property rights have developed, and we have seen
several technological innovations, e.g. the use of metal weapons and tools. All
these changes do not happen at exactly the same stage of agricultural development
across societies and regions, but the trend tends to go in the same direction when
going from one stage to the next, e.g. from low population density to higher (see
Diamond 1999; Flannery 1972; Nolan and Lenski 1999; Wright 2000).
There is an exception to this rule: slavery, or serfdom, displays a non-monotonic
pattern.1 It was rarely practiced among hunter-gatherers. Neither did the most
advanced agrarian societies use it: in Western Europe serfdom had vanished sev-
eral centuries prior to the industrial revolution.2 It is rather at intermediate levels
of development that slavery shows up.
We set up a growth model which endogenously replicates this rise-and-fall
pattern of slavery. Our results are driven by three components. Firstly, the way
society is ￿organized￿ is determined endogenously. There are several identical
tribes, or societies, each with one (potentially) dictatorial leader. There is also
a king who rules over all these leaders and imposes on them a certain ownership
structure, according to what maximizes each leader￿s payoﬀ. (This could capture
the idea that the king ￿represents￿ the tribal leaders￿ interests; or that each leader
pays a fraction of his income in tribute to the king.)
The king can give each tribal leader ownership to both the tribe￿s total land
estate and to the subjects￿ labor (making the leader a feudal lord, of sorts). With
this system the tribal leader must feed unproductive guards to watch over the
enslaved population. Another option is a free labor society, where the leader
owns the land only, but his subjects are free and supply labor on a market, being
paid their marginal product. Finally, there is the option of a fully egalitarian
hunter-gatherer society, where there are no property rights at all, so the leader
1Throughout this paper, we shall let slavery and serfdom mean the same thing. This is not
the complete truth, at least when considering Western Europe, where the lord-serf relationship
was more of a contract than a form of ownership, but this is more a matter of degree. See also
Section 2.3.1.
2According to North and Thomas (1971, p. 780) serfdom in Western Europe was ￿in an
advanced state of decay by the end of the ￿fteenth century.￿ See also Eltis (2000, Ch. 1).
3and his subjects share all output equally.3
For slavery to dominate, ￿rst of all agricultural technology must be suﬃciently
advanced, so that a surplus can be generated to feed both slaves and non-working
guards. Moreover, since guards are unproductive, slavery also requires a suﬃ-
ciently large population to be pro￿table: the smaller is the population, the higher
is the cost of holding people out of the labor force. Therefore, in labor-scarce
societies a hunter-gatherer type of equal-sharing rule may dominate slavery.
A too large population also rules out slavery, by making the marginal product
of labor fall so low that it becomes cheaper to let the slaves free, knowing that they
can be hired back at a competitive wage, without any need for guards watching
over them.
In essence, our model thus predicts that slavery dominates both free labor and
hunting and gathering when agricultural technology is suﬃciently productive, and
population density is at intermediate levels ￿ not too high, not too low. In other
words, the model suggests that growing population has played diﬀerent roles in
history: it was initially a factor which spurred the transformation of hunter-
gatherer societies into a slave societies, and later a factor driving the transition
from slavery to free labor.
This brings us to the ￿nal two components of our model: the endogenous and
joint evolution of agricultural technology and population. First, consistent with
the type of pre-industrial societies we are describing, we let children be a normal
good. This gives the model the Malthusian feature that higher per-capita incomes
induce higher fertility, and faster population growth. Second, we also allow for a
Boserupian eﬀect: population pressure spurs agricultural technological progress
(see Boserup 1965).4
The result is a feedback loop in which the economy moves from an initial state
with low population density and simple agricultural technology toward increas-
ingly dense populations and more advanced usage of land, mutually reinforcing
each other. In this process the society evolves endogenously through a hunter-
gatherer state, a slavery state, and ￿nally a free-labor state.
Our model also predicts that if an initially densely populated and free society
colonizes a sparsely populated land mass, it may switch back from freedom to
slavery. This explains why slavery was re-introduced by the Europeans in the
Americas.
3We shall let the term hunter-gatherer society refer to a society where output is shared
equally, as well as a society not using farming. In our model this makes sense, because the
equal-sharing option is chosen in less agriculturally advanced societies.
4One example could be the very birth of farming, which may have followed the extinction of
big mammals, like the mammoth (Smith 1975, 1992). Another is the empirically documented
scale eﬀect from population density to technological progress (cf. Kremer 1993, Nestmann and
Klasen 2000, and Lagerl¤ of 2002).
4We also present evidence supporting the underlying mechanisms driving our
results. First we look at what has made egalitarian societies transit into slavery.
We argue that this has required (1) dense enough population, and (2) advanced
enough agricultural technology. One indication of this is the seemingly parallel
emergence of larger-scale warfare and slavery and the common use of war captives
as slaves in early civilizations. Keeping with a military requires a certain surplus of
food and labor ￿ i.e., an average level of output suﬃciently above the subsistence
needs of each worker ￿ to make it possible to use people for other tasks than food
production.
We also present evidence from societies transiting from serfdom/slavery into
free labor: medieval Europe, 16th century Portugal, and 19th century US. Con-
sistent with our model, states/provinces had a larger fraction of slaves in the
population if they had (1) sparser populations; and (2) higher agricultural pro-
ductivity, the latter being measured as a warmer climate. We also compare slave
imports across Atlantic regions and draw the same conclusion.
Previous work on slavery includes a large literature on the plantation system
in the American South, focusing on measuring how pro￿table it was and what
could account for its pro￿tability.5 Our main aim here is rather to set up a
uni￿ed framework to explain the rise and fall of slavery as a general economic
phenomenon.
There is also some mirco-oriented literature on slavery. Fenoaltea (1984) uses
an informal model to discuss the choice between ￿sticks and carrots￿ to induce
slaves to work. More formal models include Findlay (1975), who analyzes slaves￿
incentives to work when they can buy their freedom. Again, these papers take
the slave system as given, and do not attempt to give a more macroeconomic
explanation for its rise or fall. Others analyze bonded labor as an ex-ante volun-
tary choice (see Genicot 2002 and references therein). This, however, seems a bit
aside the topic here: for example, an enslaved war captive hardly made any such
voluntary choice.
Closest to our model is Domar (1970), who makes the case that labor-abundance
was an important factor driving the transition from slavery and serfdom to free
labor. However, Domar does not discuss the shift from hunting and gathering to
slavery, or long-run agricultural technological progress, and he does not set up a
formal model.
Our paper also relates to a recent growth literature on economic and (often)
demographic development prior to the industrial revolution. This includes Galor
and Weil (1999, 2000), Galor and Moav (2002), Galor and Mountford (2002),
5Some classic contributions are Conrad and Myers (1958) and Fogel and Engerman (1974,
1977). For recent overviews see Hughes and Cain (1998, Ch. 10) and Hummel (1996, pp. 61-75).
We discuss American slavery more in the conclusions in Section 5.
5Goodfriend and McDermott (1995), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Jones (2001),
Kremer (1993), K¤ ogel and Prskawetz (2001), Lagerl¤ of (2002), Lucas (2002, Ch.
5), and Tamura (2001, 2002).6 In one sense, our work is less ambitious than
most of these papers, since we do not try to explain the most signi￿cant historical
events from the perspective of a growth theorist: the industrial revolution and the
demographic transition. In the terminology of e.g. Galor and Weil (1999, 2000),
our framework is restricted to a Malthusian phase in which living standards are
stagnant; it cannot account for the transition into sustained growth in per-capita
income. On the other hand, our work is more ambitious in another dimension: we
set up one single framework which endogenously explains a complete institutional
transformation of human societies, from egalitarianism into slavery, and further
on into a system of free labor.
Finally, our paper adds to a literature on the development of agriculture and
property rights to land in early human societies. For example, Smith (1975) pro-
poses that farming was induced by the extinction of large mammals. Baker (2002)
models land ownership under varying ecological conditions. Brander and Taylor
(1998) discusses environmental disasters in farming societies and the downfall of
early human civilizations.7 Although the themes of these papers are similar to
ours ￿ e.g. the interest in the origin of land ownership ￿ none of these papers
talks about property rights in humans,i . e . ,s l a v e r y .
This paper proceeds as follows. Next, Section 2 presents some stylized facts
about the transitions in and out of slavery. Section 3 sets up the model. The ￿rst
important result arrives in Section 3.6, where we see how the choice between the
three types of society is made. It is characterized by two state variables: popula-
tion and agricultural technology. Then, in Section 4 the dynamics of population
and agricultural technology is derived. We then see how these state variables
evolve over time and generate transitions from one type of society to another.
Section 4.4 helps the reader to get an overview of the diﬀerent components of the
model by considering a very simple numerical simulation. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Facts
We shall next discuss what makes a society practice slavery, or not. We organize
this section as follows: First, in Section 2.1, we take a ￿bird perspective￿ and
look at some anthropological evidence on how human societies have transited into
6There is also more empirically focused work on long-run growth by Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002, 2003).
7See also Skaperdas (1992) and Hirshleifer (1995) for examples of canonical models of prop-
erty rights and con￿icts. For more applications to land ownership, see Faria and de Oliveira
(2002) and Marceau and Myers (2000).















Figure 2.1: Population density by type of society. Source: Noland and Lenski
(1999, p. 125).
and out of slavery. We then take a closer look at some evidence on what forces
may have been driving each of these transitions: from egalitarianism to slavery
(Section 2.2); and from slavery to free labor (Section 2.3). Section 2.4 then sums
up our conclusions.
2.1. The full transition
The best overview of what we are trying to understand comes from looking at some
descriptive numbers from the so-called Ethnographic Atlas, a data set compiled by
the famous anthropologist G.P Murdock. This consists of some thousand human
societies known by anthropologists, both historic and present.8 Even though
it is a cross section, it tells us something about time trends, since changes in
food production (and many other variables) tend to go in one and the same
direction, e.g. from hunting and gathering to farming (see e.g. Wright 2000). The
illustrations below are based on numbers cited from Nolan and Lenski (1999).
Figure 2.1 shows how average population density varies across societies at dif-
ferent stages of agricultural development.9 As seen, when transiting from hunting
and gathering to agriculture, population density rises. This is not surprising: the
more productive is agricultural technology, the more mouths can be fed.
Figure 2.2 shows the fraction of all societies at a particular stage of develop-
8What constitutes a society is de￿ned according to certain criteria: for instance, any two
societies must have been separated for at least 1000 years to count as independent observations.
See Murdock (1967, pp. 3-6) for details.
9As mentioned, horticulture is farming without plows; agriculture with plows. Simple horti-
cultural societies are distinguished from advanced by the use metallurgy in the latter.




















Figure 2.2: Presence of ownership to land by type of society. Source: Nolan and
Lenski (1999, p. 107).
ment in which ownership to land is present. As seen, in the process of agricultural
development ownership to land becomes more common.
Figure 2.3 shows the fraction of societies practicing slavery. Slavery essentially
amounts to ownership of people. Diﬀerent from the case with land ownership,
however, slavery is most common among advanced horticultural societies, and far
less common among both hunter-gatherers and agrarian societies. As seen, this
hump-shaped pattern holds both when considering slavery in general, and when
looking at the more narrow de￿nition of hereditary slavery.
With some simpli￿cation, one may thus describe this long-run process as pass-
ing through three stages. The ￿rst stage is an egalitarian hunter-gatherer stage,
with no property rights at all. The second stage is a horticultural slave society
where both humans and land are held as property. Finally comes the agrarian
stage, where land is owned, but ownership to humans, i.e. slavery, is not prac-
ticed. Below we shall try and decide what may have been the likely causes of these
transitions.
2.2. From egalitarianism to slavery
One theory of the birth of slavery is given by Jared Diamond (1999, p. 291-292)
in his best-seller Guns, Germs, and Steel. He suggest that the increasing scale of
warfare as societies become more advanced provides a supply of war captives who
can be used as slaves. (See also Kopytoﬀ 1996.) This ￿ts with indications that
the incidence of warfare, just like slavery, depends on agricultural development
in a non-linear fashion: it is increasing with agricultural development at those
stages where slavery also becomes more common, i.e., when going from hunting
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Figure 2.3: Practice of slavery by type of society. Source: Nolan and Lenski (1999,
p. 144).
and gathering to advanced horticulture (Nolan and Lenski 1999, p. 133). As for
later stages of agricultural development, Leavitt (1977) ￿nds some evidence that
the incidence of warfare is falling. This is also consistent with the observation in
Figure 2.3, that slavery at later stages of development is more commonly heredi-
tary. Slaves in mature slave societies, like the American south, were not captured
in wars but rather supplied through breeding (slave imports to the US stopped in
1808).
Reading Diamond, the rise of warfare and slavery seems to be associated with
(1) increasing population density; and (2) expanding output per worker (i.e., more
advanced agricultural technology). The fact that there are wars to ￿ght in the ￿rst
place, and captives to take, requires a large enough population in the area which
is conquered. Otherwise, there would not be a large enough payoﬀ in terms of
enslaved labor to make it worthwhile keeping a class of warriors out of productive
activities.10 By the same token, higher output per worker is needed to generate a
surplus that makes it possible to use people for other tasks than immediate food
production, like conquering and enslaving other societies.
Note also that slavery need not be interpreted too literally here. To tax a
conquered tribe heavily could amount to the same thing and would also require
an army.
10Diamond (1999, p. 291) makes essentially the same point by pointing out that where
￿population densities are very low, as is usual in regions occupied by hunter-gatherer bands,
survivors of a defeated group need only move farther away from their enemies. That tends to
be the result of wars between nomadic tribes in New Guinea and the Amazon.￿
92.3. From slavery to free labor
Next we examine the transition from slavery into free labor. We do this by looking
at diﬀerent groups of societies which can be thought of as being on the border
of transiting from slavery into free labor. As we shall argue, the overall picture
suggests that free labor is more common, and slavery less common, in regions
with (A) colder climate; and (B) denser populations. The ￿rst factor we interpret
as a proxy for low agricultural productivity.
2.3.1. Europe
In Europe higher population density seems associated with freer labor. Serfs in
the more densely populated Western Europe had arrangements with their feudal
lords similar to voluntary labor contracts. For instance, they were tied to the
land, and could not be traded as property. Serfs in the more sparsely populated
Eastern Europe (in particular Russia) had a situation more similar to that of
slaves, in the sense that they could be sold and moved from one piece of land to
another (Domar 1970; North and Thomas 1971).
Colder climate also seems associated with freer labor, since plantation slavery
was practiced mainly in Southern Europe. The tradition goes back to the Roman
latafundia, but was revived with the introduction of sugar to Europe following
the crusades. Sugar production requires a warm and wet climate, and it is also
very labor intensive. In medieval Europe, sugar had a high value-to-bulk ratio,
implying a high marginal product of labor whereever it could be grown (Curtin
1998, p. 4). This is exactly what our theory says should make slave labor more
attractive compared to free labor.
2.3.2. Portugal
Data from Saunders (1982, pp. 49, 60) over slavery and population in six Por-
tuguese provinces 1527-1535 show that sparsely populated regions had a larger
fraction of slaves in the population (see Figure 2.4). The slope of a linear regres-
sion line is negative, although not signi￿cant at conventional risk levels.
2.3.3. The Americas
The discovery of the Americas in 1492 can be thought of as a controlled exper-
iment. At that time, serfdom and slavery had died out in most of the densely
populated Europe (Eltis 2000, pp. 1-2). The windfall drop of a largely unpopu-
lated land mass led to the reintroduction of slavery on a scale never seen before
in human history. The low population density of the Americas seems the obvious
reason why slavery was reintroduced in the ￿rst place (Domar 1970).
10Figure 2.4: Slaves (in % of population) and population density in Portugal.
Climate seems important for where slaves were shipped. Most were imported
to regions like Brazil and the Caribbean Islands (see Table 2.1 and Appendix
A.1.1 for details).11 There is another factor which can be thought of as agricultural
productivity in a wider sense, namely how close the location where the output was
produced was to the European market, i.e., to the Atlantic. Clearly, the Caribbean
Islands where better oﬀ in this respect than the inland of South America. (A ￿ip
side of this is the fact that the European economic expansion at the time occurred
in the Atlantic regions; cf. Acemoglu et al. 2003.)
Population density seems to have been important too. We may look at Table
2.1 to compare Europe, the US, and the region which corresponds to today￿s
Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. These all have roughly the same
c l i m a t e ,a n dE u r o p ea n dt h eU Sh a v ea b o u tt h es a m el a n d m a s s ;t h et h i r dr e g i o ni s
roughly half the size of Europe and the US. Out of these three regions, most slaves
were imported by the US (4.5%), with Argentina-Uruguay-Paraguay-Bolivia being
second (1%), and Europe third (0.5%). The ranking of these regions with respect
to slave imports matches that for population density, but not e.g. landmass.
11S￿ ao Thom· e received 1% of the imports, but is left out because we could not ￿nd data over
its area. Therefore the percentage column sums up to 99%.
11Region km2 (mill.) pop. (mill.) density imports (%)
Mainland Europe 9.60 81.00 8.44 0.5
Madeira, Canaries,
Cap Verde Is. 0.08 0.05 0.63 0.3
US (excl. Alaska) 7.88 0.80 0.10 4.5
Mexico 2.00 5.00 2.50 2.1
Central America, Belize 0.44 0.80 1.80 0.3
Carribean Islands 0.24 0.30 1.25 42.2
The Guyanas 0.47 0.10 0.21 5.6
Brazil 8.51 1.00 0.12 38.1
Argentina, Uruguay,
Paraguay, Bolivia 4.47 1.40 0.31 1.0
Chile 0.76 0.60 0.79 0.1
Peru 1.29 2.00 1.55 1.0
Colombia, Panama
Ecuador 1.50 1.60 1.07 2.1
Venezuela 1.91 0.40 0.44 1.3
Table 2.1: Regional shares of total slave imports in the Atlantic slave trade.
Population refers to A.D. 1500.
Figure 2.5 shows a plot of slave imports against population density in 1500.
(We use logarithmic scales, since Europe, Brazil, and the Caribbean would oth-
erwise dwarf the other regions.) The slope of a linear regression line is negative,
although not signi￿cant.
2.3.4. The United States
The strongest support for the hypothesis that density and climate are important
determinants of slavery comes from the 19th century US. As seen in Figures 2.6
and 2.7 the percentage of the population being held as slaves were lower in states
with denser population, and colder climate. A state￿s climate is measured as its
freeze period, i.e., the mean number of days per year when the temperature falls
below 32◦ Fahrenheit in the state capital (see Appendix A.1.2 for details).
Regressing the length of the freeze period and population density on the per-
centage of the population held as slaves gives:







(The standard deviations are given in parentheses.) The length of the freeze
12Figure 2.5: Slavery imports and population density across American regions and
Europe. The data is from Table 2.1.
period has a signi￿cant and negative eﬀect on the fraction of slaves; population
density has a negative and (almost) signi￿cant eﬀect.
We should also be aware of the practice of ￿white servitude￿ in regions where
plantation slavery was made impossible by the climate. This amounted to Euro-
pean immigrants paying for their fares by selling contracts on their future labor
(see e.g. Grubb 1994).
2.4. Concluding summary
T h ee v i d e n c ew eh a v ec i t e ds e e m st os u g g e s t st h a t :
I. Among societies bordering between hunting and gathering and slavery, slave
societies tend to be those with denser populations and more advanced agri-
cultural technology.
II. Among societies bordering between free labor and slavery, slave societies
tend to be those with sparser populations and more productive land (warmer
climate).
In other words, the role of growing population density has changed from being
a factor transforming hunter-gatherer societies into slave societies, to being a
13Figure 2.6: Slavery (in % of total state population) and the freeze period (see
text) across US states.
14Figure 2.7: Slavery (in % of total state population) and population density across
US states.
15factor driving the transition from slavery to free labor.
3. The Model
Consider the following overlapping-generations framework. People live in two
periods: as dependent children and working adults. Children make no decisions,
but carry a cost, q, to rear. A representative agent who is adult in period t is
referred to as agent t; we refer to him by a male pronoun.
3.1. The budget constraint
Adults earn an income (of sorts; see below) which is spent on own consumption
and child rearing. For the moment, denote this income by wt.W ec a nt h e nw r i t e
agents t￿s budget constraint as
ct = wt − qnt,( 3 . 1 )
where ct is his consumption, and nt is his number of children.
3.2. Preferences, labor, and subsistence
Labor supply is indivisible, so that each agent supplies either one unit of labor, or
none. Work requires energy: an agent must eat a certain amount of food, c,t ob e
productive. In other words, regardless how much pain incentives a slave is given
he cannot work unless he is fed at least c. To capture this, we let preferences of





(1 − β)lnct + β lnnt if ct ≥ c
−∞ if ct < c
.( 3 . 2 )
Solving the utility maximization problem amounts to maximizing the ￿rst line in
(3.2), subject to the constraint that ct ≥ c (and whatever other constraints are
relevant).
For an agent who is not working ￿ which would here be a slave owner or a
landowner ￿ the ￿rst line in (3.2) extends to the case when ct < c:
V
no work
t =( 1− β)lnct + β lnnt.( 3 . 3 )
The distinction between working and non-working agents￿ utilities is not crucial for
any of our results, but facilitates the algebra somewhat when comparing payoﬀs
later on. In particular, as long as the non-working agent earns an income far
above c this distinction will not matter.
163.3. Hunting and gathering, slavery, and free labor
Agents are dispersed across several land areas, each populated by equally many
agents. Agents living in a particular land area are referred to collectively as a
tribe, or a society. In each tribe there is ￿leader￿ who is randomly chosen by
nature in each period (i.e., this leadership is not inherited, or elected). Ruling
over all tribal leaders is one ￿king.￿ In each given period t,t h ek i n gs e t sal a wo n
how the societies should be organized, with the objective to maximize the payoﬀ
of each tribal leader in a symmetric equilibrium.12 When writing the law, the
king can choose between three sorts of society:
1. An (egalitarian) hunter-gatherer society, meaning there are no prop-
erty rights, so that total output is shared equally among all tribesmen.
2. A free (labor) society, where the tribal leader has property rights to his
tribe￿s total land estate, and his fellow tribesmen own their labor and can
work as free laborers.
3. A slave society, where the tribal leader has property rights to both the
land and his fellow tribesmen￿s labor, i.e., he is a slave owner. He must
pay the slaves their subsistence consumption (else they would not be able to
work, by assumption) and he must also cover the subsistence of some other
tribesmen to guard over the slaves to stop them from running away.
We let the choice between 1, 2, and 3 be made by a king, rather than by each
tribal leader on his own, because of an element of strategic interaction between
diﬀerent tribal leaders. For instance, one leader￿s choice to let slaves free aﬀects
the equilibrium wage rate in other tribal areas, since freed slaves can migrate. In
our setting, the king decides to abolish slavery (i.e., force all leaders to let their
subjects free) if the payoﬀ for each leader ￿ in the resulting symmetric equilibrium
￿ is greater than that of maintaining slavery.
3.4. Production
Total output in period t, Yt, depends on the tribe￿s total amount of land, M;











t ,( 3 . 4 )
where α is the land-share of output, and At denotes the productivity-augmented
size of the tribe￿s land. In other words, At can increase either due to a rise in the
12This could be motivated by assuming that the king collects a fraction of each leader￿s income
in tax.
17productivity of land (i.e., improved agricultural techniques), or due to an increase
in the amount of available land (e.g., the discovery of new continents).
3.5. The tribal leader￿s payoﬀs
Each one of the above options (1 to 3) yields a certain income, or payoﬀ,f o rt h e
tribal leader (as well as for other tribesmen). We denote the period t payoﬀ by
πi
t,w h e r ei = H,F,S indicate the payoﬀs of being a leader in a hunter-gatherer,
free, or slave society, respectively. Figure 3.1 shows how they are calculated.
Figure 3.1: Illustration of how the payoﬀs are calculated.
3.5.1. Payoﬀ in a hunter-gather society
Consider ￿rst the hunter-gatherer option. Let the adult population size be given
by Pt. In this society, each agent consumes the average product, so that the







t .( 3 . 5 )




t ≥ c). From now on, we shall restrict attention to combinations
of At and Pt where this holds. The example illustrated in Figure 3.1 shows a case
w h e r et h i si st r u e .
3.5.2. Payoﬀ in a free labor society
Consider next the free labor option. In this society, the leader owns all land,
but (for simplicity) we assume he supplies no labor. (This can be thought of as
capturing the idea that he must devote all his time to administration.) Instead he
hires his fellow tribesmen as free workers. Since there are many identical societies,
the fact that workers are free means that they can migrate to other societies, and
thus the landowner hires labor on a perfectly competitive market where he takes
the wage rate, wt,a sg i v e n .












.( 3 . 6 )
Solving the maximization problem leads to a labor demand function:




t .( 3 . 7 )
Since an agent must eat c to be able to work, labor supply is given by
Lt =
(
Pt if wt ≥ c
0i f wt < c
.( 3 . 8 )
Depending on At and Pt there are now two possible types of equilibrium:
one where all agents work, and one where only some of them work. These are
illustrated in Figure 3.2. Consider ￿rst Case A. This is a society with a small
population (like P 0
t in Figure 3.2), so that all agents can work and the marginal









α Pt. The land-owning tribal leader simply keeps the land-share of
output, given by Aα
t P
1−α











Next, consider Case B. This refers to a society with a large population (like
P1
t in Figure 3.2), implying that only some of the agents work and eat whereas
the rest starve and/or die, and the equilibrium wage is kept down to subsistence











Figure 3.2: How the wage rate is determined. In Case A, where population size
equals P0
t , the marginal product of labor is large enough that free workers can live
on the competitive wage; in Case B, where population size equals P1
t ,t h ew a g ei s
kept down to subsistence.









α At. Inserted into the pro￿t expression inside the
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3.5.3. Payoﬀ in a slave society
Consider ￿nally the slavery option. In this society, the leader owns all land,
and forces his fellow tribesmen to work for him as slaves. He pays each slave
the minimal amount required to keep him productive, c. We also assume that
he must pay someone to guard the slaves, to keep them from eloping. Let γ
20denote the number of guards needed to watch over one slave, and let each guard￿s
consumption be kept to the same level as that of the slaves, c. Then the cost of
keeping St slaves equals (1 + γ)cSt.13 The returns to the slave owner are simply
given by total output, with the number of slaves, St,r e p l a c i n gLt in the production
function in (3.4).14
Note that the slave owner does not need to hold all his tribesmen as slaves;
he may let some of them free (or kill them).15 The maximum number of slaves is
restricted by the number of agents in the tribe, Pt, minus the guards needed to
watch over them (which, recall, amounts to γ per slave). Therefore, the number











t − (1 + γ)cSt
o
.( 3 . 1 2 )
Let S∗
t denote the ￿desired￿ number of slaves. This is simply the unconstrained
choice of St in (3.12) above, given by (1 − α)Aα
t S
−α










The slave owner will be unconstrained in the number of slaves if the desired
number of slaves, plus the γS∗
t guards needed to watch over them, is less than the
tribe￿s total population, i.e. if S∗










Pt ≡ Γ(Pt;γ). (3.14)
We shall call this Case 1. This amounts to keeping S∗
t agents as slaves, and
S∗
tγ guarding the slaves; the remainder are set free (or killed). The slave owner￿s
13Here we assume that guards do not need to be guarded. We could just as well assume that
e a c hg u a r dm u s tb ew a t c h e db yγ guards, who in turn must be watched by γ guards, and so on.
Assuming γ < 1 the cost of keeping St slaves would become
cSt + cγSt + cγ2St + ... = cSt/(1 − γ),
which is equivalent to our formulation, if we de￿ne a new parameter η > 0, such that 1 + η =
1/(1 − γ).
14With an alternative interpretation we could call guards ￿warriors,￿ and say their task is to
conquer and enslave another people (￿people￿ here meaning another segment of the tribe; we
can think of those enslaved as e.g. belonging to another ethnic group). Each warrior enslaves
1/γ other tribesmen. For example, the warriors could be Romans and the slaves captives from
defeated Germanic tribes. In that sense, our model ￿ts with the stylized facts about war,
conquest, and slavery, discussed in Section 2.2.
15As we shall see, in the case slavery will always be dominated by a free labor society.















Next, consider Case 2, where the slave owner is constrained: Pt/(1 + γ)
agents are kept as slaves, and the remainder used for guarding the slaves. The










− cPt.( 3 . 1 6 )



















α At if At ≤ Γ(Pt;γ)
.( 3 . 1 7 )
3.6. Comparing payoﬀs
The king will choose hunting and gathering, slavery, or freedom, respectively,




These payoﬀs are given by (3.9), (3.11), and (3.17). The choice thus depends on






1 − α(1 + γ)1−α
# 1
α
Pt,( 3 . 1 8 )
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# 1
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We can now state the following (proven in Appendix A.2):
Proposition 1. The payoﬀs associated with slavery, hunting and gathering, and
free labor are ordered as follows:
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t } ⇐⇒ {Pt ≥ 1/α and Φ(Pt) ≤ At ≤ Ψ(Pt)}; (3.22)
3. Hunting and gathering dominates otherwise.
What this proposition states is most easily understood from Figure 3.3. As
seen, hunting and gathering dominates at low levels of At and Pt,a n da ni n c r e a s e
in either could move the economy into the slave region. The intuition is that a
rise in At implies more pro￿ts to reap by introducing slavery compared to sharing
equally. A rise in Pt means a lower payoﬀ under the equal sharing rule, but only
gains for a slave owner since he has his tribesmen￿s labor at his own disposal (i.e.,
he can kill some if he ￿nds their marginal product too low relative to the costs of
feeding and guarding them).
The region in which hunting and gathering dominates becomes larger at the
expense of the slavery region if, for example, subsistence consumption, c,i n c r e a s e s .
[Note that the border separating the hunting and gathering and slavery regions
￿ Ω(Pt) ￿ is increasing c.] Since c measures what the slave owner must pay to
feed each slave, a higher c makes slavery less attractive. With the same logic, the
hunter-gatherer region expands and the slavery region shrinks if the guard-per-
slave ratio, γ, rises, as this makes it costlier to hold slaves.
Next compare slavery to free labor. An increase in Pt lowers the marginal
product of labor. This makes free labor cheaper and more pro￿table compared
to slavery, moving the economy from the slavery region into the free labor region.
Vice versa, a rise in At ￿ e.g., an increase in the land available, following to the
discovery of the Americas ￿ could push an economy from the free labor region
into the slavery region, as it raises the marginal product of labor and makes it
less attractive to pay workers a competitive wage.
We also see that the border separating the free labor and slavery regions ￿
Ψ(Pt) ￿ pivot-shifts up when c and γ increase, as this makes slavery less attractive.
Finally, we see that the hunting and gathering region grows at the expense of
the free labor region if the land-share of output, α, falls, since this makes it less
attractive to be a landowner in a competitive market.
23α
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Figure 3.3: Regions where slavery, hunting and gathering, or free labor is chosen.
4. Dynamics
Having determined how the selection of the type of society depends on population
and agricultural technology, we next look at how population and agricultural
technology evolve over time in each type of society.
4.1. Agricultural technology
We let At evolve according to





where A is some minimum level of agricultural technology, D>0, and θ ∈ (0,1).
The Boserupian feature of this relationship is that At grows faster if population
pressure, Pt/At, is large. One example could be the very birth of farming, which
may have followed the extinction of big mammals, like the mammoth (Smith 1975,
1992). It could also capture a scale eﬀect from population density to technological
progress (cf. Kremer 1993, Nestmann and Klasen 2000, and Lagerl¤ of 2002).
4.2. Population
4.2.1. Population dynamics in a free labor society
The most complicated population dynamics appear in a free labor society, since
both the landowner and the workers rear children. Consider ￿rst the landowner.
24He does not perform any physical work so his fertility is given by maximizing
(3.3), subject to (3.1) with πF
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Next consider workers. Recall that the work force will always adjust so that
the equilibrium wage rate never falls below subsistence consumption: wt ≥ c.
Maximizing each worker￿s utility function in (3.2), subject to (3.1), gives the





q if c ≤ wt < c
1−β ≡ w
βwt
q if wt ≥ c
1−β ≡ w
.( 4 . 3 )
The landowner has zero measure, so Pt constitutes the total mass of agents. All
a g e n t sd i ea f t e rt h ea d u l tp h a s eo fl i f e ,s oPt+1 is simply given by the total number
of children born in period t, i.e., the sum of: (1) the landowner￿s number of




t Pt + n
landowner
t .( 4 . 4 )
To simplify the analysis, and reduce the number of cases needed to be consid-
ered, we now make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. n =
βc
(1−β)q < 1 − α.
This implies that a free society with a very large population ￿ such that the
wage rate falls below c
1−β ≡ w ￿ will see its population falling over time. (See
Appendix A.3 for details.) To understand this, note that we can interpret w as
the wage rate at which the subsistence constraint (ct ≥ c) is just binding, and
n is the associated fertility rate. This means that a worker earning wt < w has
fewer than n children, and if n<1 the working class cannot reproduce itself.
Population may still be growing if n>1 − α. In this case, the land-share of
output is large enough to make the fertility of the single landowner compensate
for the below-reproduction birth rate of the working class. This case is ruled out
by imposing Assumption 1.
Consider thus a society where wt ≥ c
1−β ≡ w. Since this implies that wt > c,




(cf. Figure 3.2). Using (4.2) to (4.4) we can then write the population dynamics
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We thus conclude that population in a free society evolves according to:
























α Pt.( 4 . 6 )
4.2.2. Population dynamics in a hunter-gatherer society
In a hunter-gatherer society all agents have the same income, given by πH
t in (3.5).
Since all are working, their fertility rates are derived in a similar fashion as with
workers in the free-labor case above. Analogous to (4.3) we can thus write the

















.( 4 . 7 )
It is straightforward to check that under Assumption 1, πH
t < w implies that
Pt+1 <P t: a hunter-gatherer society where average output falls below w cannot
reproduce itself (cf. the case for workers in a free society above). When πH
t ≥ w
we can use the de￿nition of πH
t in (3.5) together with the second line in (4.7). It
is then seen that the population dynamics coincide with that of a free society [see
(4.5)], and the sign of ∆Pt is illustrated by (4.6).
4.2.3. Population dynamics in a slave society
Finally, consider a slave society. Recall that slaves￿ consumption is constrained
to subsistence, implying that their fertility rate is zero, so population dynamics
are driven solely by the leader￿s fertility. This can be thought of as a caricature
of the demographic features of the ￿rst civilizations on earth. These were all
strongly polygynous, and the rulers had more wives, or sex partners, and thus
more oﬀspring, than their subjects (Betzig 1986, 1993).
Thus, population in period t + 1 is given by the slave owner￿s number of





























α At if At ≤ Γ(Pt;γ)
.( 4 . 8 )
26where Γ(Pt;γ)i sd e ￿ned in (3.14). Recalling Assumption 1 again, the second line





Pt <P t. This implies that
in a slave society population is always shrinking whenever At ≤ Γ(Pt;γ). This
leaves us with the ￿rst line in (4.8), which tells us that population shrinks (or












< (>)Pt. Rearranging, we thus conclude
that population in a slave society evolves according to:



























α Pt.( 4 . 9 )
4.3. Phase diagram for all three societies
At a given level of At, either (4.6) or (4.9) characterizes how population evolves
over time ￿ which depends on what type of society is chosen. Free societies and
hunter-gatherer societies have the same population dynamics, as given by (4.6).
We let (∆Pt =0 ) H/F denote the locus along which free societies and hunter-
gatherer societies have constant population (Pt+1 = Pt). This is simply the equal-
ity case in (4.6). Similarly, for a slave society we denote the corresponding locus
by (∆Pt =0 ) S, as given by the equality case in (4.9).
The corresponding (∆At = 0)-locus ￿ which is the same in the hunter-gatherer,
slave, and free regions ￿ is given by setting At+1 = At in (4.1). We can write this
as At = ζ









.( 4 . 1 0 )
Examples of these loci are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
4.3.1. Hunting and gathering, slavery, and freedom ￿ the full transition
The speci￿c shapes of the diﬀerent loci depend on exogenous parameters (see
Appendix A.4). Consider ￿rst the case illustrated in Figure 4.1. Here the (∆Pt =
0)S-locus does not appear because it is too ￿at to enter the slavery region; we can
say that the (∆Pt =0 ) S-locus is ￿invisible.￿ In other words, population is never
constant at levels of At and Pt where slavery dominates.
Let the economy start oﬀ somewhere in the hunting and gathering region,
between the (∆At =0 ) -a n d( ∆Pt =0 ) H/F-loci. From there At and Pt will
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Figure 4.1: The full transition.
population growth in a Malthusian fashion. This feeds back into more agricultural
progress through the Boserupian eﬀect, and so on.
As the economy enters the slavery region (if it does ￿ this depends on starting
values) population dynamics is governed by the diﬀerence equation which refers to
a slave society, i.e. (4.9). As a result, population growth slows. [I.e., population
still grows in the slavery region, because the economy is above the (∆Pt =0 ) S-
locus. However, population grows slower because the economy is closer to the
(∆Pt =0 ) S-locus than it was to the (∆Pt =0 ) H/F-locus in the hunter-gatherer
region.] With population continually growing ￿ and agricultural technology being
bounded from above, or not growing too fast ￿ the economy eventually reaches
the free labor region, and completes the transition.
4.3.2. Diﬀerential paths
As shown in Appendix A.4, there may exist a locally stable steady state within the
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Figure 4.2: The case with a stagnant slavery trap.
29q β α θ A D γ c
2.75 0.18 0.88 0.6 20 5.74 0.75 1
Table 4.1: Parameter values.
could follow either a trajectory leading from hunting and gathering directly into
free labor; or it could get sucked into the slavery region and stagnate in a trap
with low levels of both At and Pt.
4.4. A numerical example
It becomes somewhat easier to follow the workings of the model by looking at
a simple numerical simulation. Table 4.1 shows a set of parameter values which
generates a type of dynamics shown in Figure 4.1. Note that there is no reason
for choosing this particular set of numbers; they serve only as an illustration.
Figure 4.3 shows the diﬀerent regions corresponding to those in Figure 3.3.
Figure 4.4 shows the loci corresponding to those in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Figure
4.5 shows the path of the economy through the three regions, corresponding to
the trajectory in Figure 4.1. The start values are set to P0 =0 .1a n dA0 = 10.
Figure 4.6 compiles all this information into one diagram. We now see how
population growth ￿ as measured by the increments on the Pt- a x i s￿s l o w sd o w n
in the slavery region, where the dynamics are governed by the (∆Pt =0 ) S-locus.
[Note that the (∆Pt =0 ) S-locus does not enter the slavery region.] When the
trajectory enters the free labor region population growth spurts again as the
economy starts gravitating toward the (∆Pt =0 ) H/F-locus. Note that the path is
completely deterministic, although it looks somewhat stochastic as it enters the
free labor region.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents a uni￿ed model explaining the rise and fall of slavery. A
number of identical tribes, each with one leader, can be organized in either one
of three ways: each tribal leader may own his tribe￿s land and his tribesmen￿s
labor (a slave society); the leader may own the land only but have no slaves (a
society with free labor); or there may be no property rights at all (an egalitarian
hunter-gatherer society). A king who rules over all tribes then decides how the
societies should be organized, according to what maximizes the income of each
tribal leader.
The tribal leaders￿ payoﬀs are maximized under a slave society if the agricul-
tural technology is productive enough, and population is at intermediate levels. If
30Figure 4.3: The slave, free, and hunter-gatherer regions.
Figure 4.4: The loci.
31Figure 4.5: The trajectory with start values set to P0 =0 .1a n dA0 = 10.
Figure 4.6: All information in one graph. Note how population dynamics in the
slave region diﬀer from that of the other regions.
32population is too large, a free labor society dominates slavery, since the marginal
product of labor is so low that it is cheaper to hire free workers than holding
them as slaves and paying guards to watch over them. If population is too small,
a hunter-gatherer society dominates slavery, because the shortage of labor makes
it too expensive to keep people as unproductive guards.
There are variations to this story, which may in some cases overlap with ours.
Consider ￿rst the question why slavery was introduced. Some would reformulate
this question and ask why highly strati￿ed class societies came to replace more
egalitarian ones. This seems to require some type of ￿surplus,￿ to support a non-
working population, like a military or bureaucracy. There is also some consensus
that this surplus followed with the development of more productive ways of using
the land (see e.g. Diamond 1999). Another theory is suggested by Lucas (2002, p.
134) who suggests that the surplus may have resulted from improved incentives to
accumulate resources, driven by the introduction of property rights. In our model
the causality is reverse: agricultural advancement, and/or a growing population
causes the introduction of property rights by generating enough resources for a
despotic leader to claim and defend these rights.
As for why slavery was abandoned there are many competing theories, some of
which partly overlap with ours. A lot of interest has been paid to slavery in the
US, although it was not quantitatively the largest slave society at the time (see
Table 2.1). This debate has focused on questions about whether slavery would
have survived, had it not been for the civil war, and, if so, for how long. (See
Hughes and Cain 1998, Ch. 10, for an overview.)
It seems well established that plantation slavery before the civil war earned a
high return compared to other investments and was not a sector of the economy in
decay, suggesting that slavery would not have vanished without the civil war (cf.
Conrad and Myers 1958). However, later research has pointed to the unusually
high cotton prices around this time; they fell sharply in the 1870￿s (see e.g. Hughes
and Cain 1998, p. 271, and further references therein). The fall in cotton prices
m a yh a v eb e e nd u et oi n c r e a s e dp r o d u c t i o ni nI n d i a .C o n s i s t e n tw i t ho u rm o d e l ,
the fact that India could grow a labor intensive crop like cotton without using
slavery in turn seems related to its high population density. (This theory is
consistent with Galor and Mountford 2002 who argue that Chinese and Indian
industrialization was hampered due to an abundance of labor.)
Aside from the high cotton prices prior to the civil war Hummel (1996) suggests
that slavery would have been far less pro￿table had it not been for the Fugitive
Slave Law of the North, which provided legal support for Southern slave-owners
to retrieve their run-away property. This essentially constituted a subsidy on the
cost of keeping slaves in check (captured by the parameter γ in our model).
Note ￿nally that the abolishment of slavery imposes great capital losses on
33slave-owners (see e.g. Goldin 1973). Thus, slavery being so pro￿tably may simply
re￿ect the fact that the return to investing in slaves and other plantation capital
earned a risk premium over the return to other investments.
Another issue is the impact of the Black Death on European serfdom. If we
believe the theory presented here, a signi￿cant fall in population should push
the economy from free labor to slavery/serfdom. This failed to happen after the
Black Death. Domar (1970) suggests that one reason could be the expansion of
less labor intensive forms of agriculture, in particular sheep herding. In terms
of our model this would amount to a rise in the land-share of output, α,w h i c h
expands the free-labor region at the expense of the slavery region in Figure 3.3.
Another explanation could be that the 25% reduction in population during
the years of the Black Death in the 1360￿s ￿ however huge it may seem ￿ was not
large enough. European population fell to the levels of 1200, and had recovered
by 1500 (McEvedy and Jones 1978, p. 18). These are not a huge leaps in time,
considering that maybe 1000 (or more) years had elapsed from the time at which




A.1.1. Data over the Atlantic slave trade
The numbers for area and population size in Table 2.1 come from McEvedy and
Jones (1978). The density numbers are simply the second column over the ￿rst.
One may note that the density ￿gures are very close to those reported in Acemoglu
et al. (2002), which may be of better quality. Here we use McEvedy and Jones
since we need to aggregate regions (like the whole of mainland Europe) to compile
with data over to slave imports. The numbers for slave imports are from Curtin
(1969, Table 24). S￿ ao Thom· e received 1% of the imports, but is left out because
we could not ￿nd data over its area.
A.1.2. US data
The table in Figure A.1 shows the numbers used for the plots in Figures 2.6 and
2 . 7 .T h ef r e e z ep e r i o di sd e ￿ned as the mean number of days per year in which the
temperature falls below 32◦ Fahrenheit (0◦ Celsius). These numbers were retrieved
from the Weatherbase website at http://www.weatherbase.com, and refer to the
state capital (except for Maryland, where the freeze period refers to Baltimore;
the Weatherbase web site had no data for Annapolis).
34Data over population size, the number of slaves, and population density come
from Potter (1965; Tables 11 and 12). We removed the outlier DC, since its
population density was so exceptionally high. The density numbers are taken
directly from the table, since they were calculated using the area of each state
at the time. Potter also reports the total area of the same states today in his
tables, which in some cases makes population size and area inconsistent with the
reported density numbers. This also explains why e.g. Texas￿ population density






Comparing slavery to hunting and gathering, we need to distinguish between the
two cases for calculating πS
t .C o n s i d e r ￿rst Case 1, which upon recalling (3.14)

























1−α) ≡ Λ(Pt). (A.1)
Consider next Case 2: At > Γ(Pt;γ). Using (3.5) and the ￿rst line of (3.17),











t . This requires both that
Pt > (1 + γ)1−α and At ≥ Ω(Pt), where Ω(Pt)i sd e ￿ned in (3.19).




















Comparing hunting and gathering to freedom, we distinguish between the two
cases for calculating πF





α Pt. Using (3.5) and
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35Freeze period
State Population Slaves Density Population Slaves Density Days<32F
Maine 583 0 17 628 0 21 151.1
New Hampshire 318 0 40 326 0 36 171
Vermont 314 0 39 315 0 35 178.7
Massachusetts 995 0 137 1231 0 153 97
Rhode Island 148 0 123 175 0 164 117
Connecticut 371 0 78 460 0 96 134
New York 3097 0 67 3881 0 81 147
New Jersey 489 0 72 672 0 89 85
Pennsylvania 2312 0 49 2906 0 65 106
Delaware 92 2 43 112 0 57 87.2
Maryland 583 90 53 687 87 69 97
Virginia 1422 473 23 1596 491 25 79
North Carolina 869 289 19 993 331 20 76
South Carolina 668 385 24 704 402 23 57
Georgia 906 382 16 1057 462 18 48
Florida 87 39 2 140 62 3 30
Ohio 1980 0 50 2340 0 57 117
Indiana 988 0 29 1350 0 38 117
Illinois 851 0 15 1712 0 31 111
Michigan 398 0 7 749 0 13 149
Wisconsin 305 0 6 776 0 14 160
Kentucky 982 211 26 1156 225 29 102
Tennessee 1003 239 23 1110 276 27 76
Alabama 772 343 15 964 435 19 38
Mississippi 607 310 13 791 437 17 49
Iowa 192 0 4 675 0 12 137
Missouri 682 87 11 1182 115 17 114
Arkansas 210 47 4 435 111 8 56
Louisiana 518 245 13 708 332 16 21
Texas 212 58 7 604 183 2 19
California 93 0 0.5 380 0 2 18
Oregon 52 0 0.5 64
Washington 12 0 0.1 85
Minnesota 172 0 2 117
Kansas 107 0 1 122
1850 1860
new states in 1860
Figure A.1: Data for Figures 2.6 and 2.7. Numbers for population and slaves are
in thousands.





α Pt. Using (3.5) and the second line in







α At ≥ Aα
t P
−α
t ,o rAt ≥ Φ(Pt), where
Φ(Pt)i sd e ￿n e di n( 3 . 2 0 ) .





α Pt is always greater than Φ(Pt)w h e nPt exceeds 1
α.





t ⇐⇒ Pt ≥
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The most complicated comparison is between slavery and free labor, since the
payoﬀs to choosing either involve two cases each. Consider ￿rst the combination
of Case A under free labor and Case 2 under slavery, which we shall name Case





α Pt [see (3.14) and recall that γ > 0] this can be written
as
At ≥ Γ(Pt;γ). (A.5)












− cPt. This becomes At ≥ Ψ(Pt), where Ψ(Pt)i sd e ￿n e di n( 3 . 1 8 ) .
Consider next the combination of Case A under free labor and Case 1 under





Pt <A t < Γ(Pt;γ). (A.6)


















Pt =( 1+γ)Γ(Pt;γ), (A.7)
which always holds in Case II, where At < Γ(Pt;γ)[ s e e( A . 6 )a b o v e ] .
Consider ￿nally the combination of Case B under free labor and Case 1 under
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α At,o r( 1+γ)
1−α
α > 1, which always holds.
37To sum up, in Cases II and III πF
t ≥ πS
t always holds; in Case I, πF
t ≥ πS
t
holds unless At > Ψ(Pt). Note that At > Ψ(Pt) can only hold in Case I, since






t ⇐⇒ At ≤ Ψ(Pt). (A.9)



















t .A ss e e nf r o m( A . 9 ) ,πS
t ≥ πF
t
requires that At ≥ Ψ(Pt).
The second condition on the right-hand side of the implication arrow in (A.2)
shows the condition for πS
t ≥ πH
t .A s l o n ga sπS
t ≥ πF
t and thus At ≥ Ψ(Pt), it
must always hold that At > Γ(Pt;γ)s i n c eΨ(Pt) > Γ(Pt;γ) [see (A.5) and (3.18)].








is greater than both Ψ(Pt)a n dΩ(Pt), and Pt is strictly greater than (1 + γ)1−α,
i.e.,
Pt > (1 + γ)
1−α and At ≥ max{Ψ(Pt),Ω(Pt)},( A . 1 0 )
as stated in Proposition 1.



















t .A ss e e nf r o m( A . 9 ) ,πF
t ≥ πS
t
requires that At ≤ Ψ(Pt). The condition for πF
t ≥ πH
t i sg i v e ni n( A . 4 ) :b o t h
Pt ≥ 1








Φ(Pt) ≤ At ≤ Ψ(Pt)a n dPt ≥
1
α
,( A . 1 1 )
as stated in Proposition 1.
A.3. Population dynamics in free societies
We here show that if wt < w in a free society it implies that its population is





α Pt. Then the labor force, Lt,
adjusts so that the wage rate equals subsistence consumption: wt = c.T h u s
nworker



















α Pt <P t,






α Pt, implying that the wage rate exceeds subsistence consumption:
wt > c.T h u s , nworker
t = wt−c






q Pt.S i n c e a l l
Pt agents are working it must hold that wt =( 1− α)Aα
t P
−α
t . Some algebra then
tells us that Pt+1 =
cβ
q(1−α)(1−β)Pt.T h e n wt < w, together with Assumption 1
demonstrates that Pt+1 <P t.
A.4. Steady-state equilibria with hunting and gathering and freedom
From (4.6) and (4.9) we see that the (∆Pt =0 ) S-locus slopes steeper than the
(∆Pt =0 ) H/F-locus. For the (∆Pt =0 ) S-locus to pass through the slavery region,
it must slope steeper than the line separating slavery from freedom, i.e. Ψ(Pt)
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If this holds, and assuming the right shape of the (∆At =0 ) - l o c u s ,t h e r ee x i s t s
a steady state with slavery, as given by the intersection of the (∆Pt =0 ) S-locus
and the (∆At = 0)-locus, and illustrated in Figure 4.2.
In Figure 4.2 it also holds that the (∆Pt =0 ) H/F-locus passes through the
region with free labor. In other words, the line separating slavery from freedom ￿
Ψ(Pt)i n( 3 . 1 8 )￿i ss t e e p e rt h a nt h e( ∆Pt =0 ) H/F-locus. Using (3.18) and (4.6),





.( A . 1 3 )
Thus, with the right shape of the (∆At = 0)-locus, we can also have a steady state
w i t hf r e el a b o ra tt h ep o i n tw h e r et h e( ∆Pt =0 ) S-locus and the (∆At =0 ) - l o c u s
intersect.
Figure 4.2 shows the case where both (A.12) and (A.13) hold. Note that, if




c/α+q/β. In this case the (∆Pt =0 ) S-locus never intersects the slavery region (and
is thus invisible), but the (∆Pt =0 ) H/F-locus intersects the free labor region. This
is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
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